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The "Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs"' offers an extensive and challenging critique of current intellectual property protection of software. The authors argue strongly that the law should focus on the value of the know-how embodied in programs and the importance of protecting it, rather than on the particular means which might be used to appropriate it. 2 The authors seek to compel reconceptualization of the place of computer programs, and of software authors' creativity, within the domain of intellectual property. However, their brief for change manifests several flaws. Paradoxically, it comes at once both too soon and too late. In addition, its expectation for the adoption of its proposed alternatives is too optimistic, while its perception of the ability of copyright law to afford appropriate protection for computer programs is too pessimistic.
The Manifesto's objectives and the moment chosen for their declaration are perplexing, if not quixotic. As the authors on several occasions acknowledge, 3 the computer software industry is currently thriving. Moreover, copyright protection for computer programs has now become the worldwide norm. Not only the U.S., but the E.C. and all members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade have determined to protect computer programs as literary works, within the meaning of the dominant international copyright convention. 4 Even supposing that a specter of over-and underprotection haunts the software industry, the alternative intellectual property regimes the authors evoke are likely neither to achieve domestic enactment, nor to secure broad and effective international agreement. Finally, the Manifesto's essential premise, that copyright law ill befits computer programs because the law does not protect works that "behave," betrays too cramped an appreciation of the subject matter and scope of copyright protection. Copyright does, to some ex-The authors proffer no evidence that copyright protection of computer programs is currently chilling software development. On the contrary, the Manifesto recognizes the industry's continued vitality. However, posit the authors, recent restrictive trends in the courts, as well as anticipated technological developments in reverse engineering, portend ill for future program innovation. 5 Both these propositions are problematic. First, if the judicial pendulum seemed at first to swing toward sweeping protection of even the most abstract elements of computer programs, 6 and then toward stingy protection of only the program's literal text, 7 courts now appear to be drawing a more moderate arc. For example, all Circuits that have addressed the question agree that, in principle, copyright protects not only literal code, but also nonliteral elements of a program, such as its structure, sequence and organization. 8 Courts disagree over the level of abstraction at which the program will be protected, as well as over the identification of the "expression" that may be protected without risk of monopolizing the "idea" or "process" underlying the program.
9 But this disagreement is hardly peculiar to computer programs. There is a danger, but not only with respect to computer programs, that courts, in seeking to distinguish the public domain "idea" from the protected "expression," will so "dissect" the work as to classify all its elements as unprotectable. Indeed, the Second Circuit did so flay the expression of a computer program operating system in Computer Associates v. Altai.
3 But other courts, including those deciding cases concerning computer programs, have recognized that zeal to eliminate unprotectable elements may blind the court to the expressiveness of their ensemble.
14 Thus the Tenth Circuit, while endorsing the "abstraction-filtration-comparison" test announced in Altai, added this important gloss:
We suggest that a court will often be assisted in determining the factual issue of copying if both programs are first compared in their entirety without filtering out the unprotected elements....
[A] n initial holistic comparison may reveal a pattern of copying that is not obvious when only certain components are examined.
15
The Fifth Circuit has followed the Tenth in effecting an overall comparison of the works at issue: "The ultimate focus... should be on the input formats and output reports taken as a whole."' 6 If courts continue to keep sight of the work as a whole, the fear of underprotection may dissipate.
Second, and especially poignant in light of the judicial developments just evoked, it is hazardous to devise a new "market-oriented" intellectual property regime to respond to conditions yet to be created. The "market" foreseen by the lawmaker today may be quite different from the market that actually appears tomorrow.
11 The "orientation" sought might 17. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1988) (extensive and detailed disposition concerning compulsory licensing of television programs for cable distribution). Many of the economic assumptions underlying the drafting of this provision in the mid-1970s were already out-of-then prove to have gone astray. Moreover, as Part II will develop, it may well be more difficult to enact a "market-oriented" noncopyright regime in the U.S., than to continue the work ofjudicial adaptation of copyright principles to software. As a general proposition, courts and copyright counselors may be more at ease applying known principles and analyses to new subject matter, than interpreting a new text that purports to present a new and particular approach.' 8
B. Too Late
Copyright protection of computer programs is not simply compatible with software creators' needs; it has become the international intellectual property norm. Since the U.S. confirmed the copyrightability of computer programs in 1980,1 9 many Western European countries have amended their copyright laws to provide explicitly for computer program protection. 20 it seems most unlikely that, having at last secured agreement on copyright as the international norm, GAT'E members will soon substitute a different protective regime.
Moreover, there is no ready alternative to copyright as provided in GATT/TRIPs. The Manifesto optimistically suggests that article 10bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property could provide effective international protection against "cloning."
2 4 This is doubtful. To be sure, article 10bis includes a general obligation to member countries "to assure to nationals of... [Union] countries effective protection against unfair competition." 25 However, this provision has not afforded a meaningful guarantee, for the treaty's definition of unfair competition leaves too much room for inconsistent and uncertain application.
The text prohibits "[a] ny act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters." 26 The two key terms are "act of competition" and "contrary to honest practices." These terms, however, refer to different legal regimes. According to a leading commentary on the treaty, the national law of each member country will determine what acts constitute "acts of competition," while international trade norms will determine the meaning of "honest practices." (1968) . The Guide enjoys a high degree of authority, as it was written by the Director of the United International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI), the predecessor organization to World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the entity charged with administering the Paris and Berne Conventions.
As an example of international trade norms, the recent GATT/TRIPs accord incorporates Paris Convention art. 10bis with respect to protection of trade secrets, and defines "a manner contrary to honest commercial practices" as "at least practices such as breach of contract, breach of confidence and inducement to breach, and includes the The treaty's failure to give content to these terms seriously weakens article 10bis. Consider the unauthorized adaptation of a computer program to a "hardware platform" for which it was not originally designed. Reference to a given member country's law may yield different responses as to whether the unauthorized transporting of the program would constitute "competition." 28 If it would not, then even if the conduct complained of were "contrary to honest practices," the treaty apparently would not apply. For example, assume that breaking into computer security codes or tapping into telephone connections violates international norms of "honest practices." 29 Assume also that, in the applicable forum, using the information thus acquired to create a related, but not directly competing program is not an act of "competition." In that case, the Paris Convention may not require awarding relief.
Similarly, even if the forum would classify the challenged act as "competition," if the act does not also violate international norms of "honest practices," then article 10bis will not apply. Thus, if defendant "clones" a user interface, but does so using publicly available information, it is not clear that (in the absence of copyright protection) this act would violate international standards of fair play. As a result, one must question the ability of the Paris Convention to supply an alternative norm of intellectual property protection for computer programs.
These pragmatic concerns about the timing of the Manifesto might yield to a demonstration that, as a matter both of practice and of principle, a sui generis software protection regime would provide better, surer, and more harmonious coverage for creativity in programming. In fact, however, as Part II maintains, in the U.S. there is little security to be gained from abandoning copyright in favor of unfair competition law. Moreover, copyright protection of computer programs is not as discordant as the Manifesto contends. 
A. Too Optimistic
The bulk of the Manifesto addresses the perceived inadequacies or inappropriateness of traditional forms of intellectual property law to regulate computer programs. The authors' treatment of alternatives is, however, regrettably scant. In essence, the authors propose to substitute either a "registration system for innovative compilations of applied knowhow embodied in software," 3 0 or a misappropriation-based regime of unfair competition law. 31 Neither alternative seems likely to succeed, at least not imminently.
With respect to the registration alternative, so long as effective copyright or trade secret protections are available, software proprietors are unlikely to be willing to trade them for a compulsory license registration system. This is because the proposed registry, while affording compensation, denies the registrants any control over the use of their works. Collective or compulsory licensing substitutes compensation for control where there is no effective means to police unauthorized exploitation, or where the transaction costs of negotiated licenses are too high.
3 2 It is therefore not a first resort 3 3 The envisioned registry could have considerable appeal as a voluntary adjunct to copyright protection (particularly if its details were more developed than they are in the Manifesto), and some software producers may well find it highly desirable some of the time. But absent a genuine crisis in the traditional intellectual property protection of computer programs, a generalized and exclusive registration/compulsory license system seems a remote possibility.
The Manifesto's proposal to substitute unfair competition law for property-right based regimes ignores the persistent opposition by the Supreme Court and other persuasive authority to the resurrection of common-law misappropriation claims. For example, the American Law Institute, in the recently issued Restatement of the Law of Unfalr Competition, has rejected the misappropriation doctrine, stressing that no liability exists for the mere appropriation of "intangible trade values. the Court ruled that a Florida "plug-molding" statute (providing, in effect, "andcloning" protection for boat hulls) was preempted by federal patent law. The Court's rationale extends beyond federalism concerns, for the Court stressed the general principle of free copying: "free exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the protection of a federal patent is the exception .... [T]he federal patent laws must determine not only what is protected, but also what is free for all to use." 3 6 In other words, if the innovation is not protected by a formal property-right regime, then neither federal nor state courts should entertain interstitial anti-copying claims.
Of course, Congress could enact a Federal Unfair Competition Act pursuant to the Commerce Clause, 3 7 but the content of such a law requires careful consideration. Unfortunately, the Manifesto gives too little attention to the detail of legislative approaches.
B. Too Pessimistic
The Manifesto's central criticism of copyright protection for computer programs emphasizes that software "behaves," and that copyright does not protect "behavior," particularly if the "behavior" is "functional." 3 8 There are at least two difficulties with this contention. First, copyright in fact protects a wide variety of works that "behave." Second, "functionality" is not a general bar to copyright protection. Traditionally, copyright subsists in original works of authorship whatever the purpose of the work, 3 9 so long as a multitude of means of achieving the "purpose" remain available. The problem is defining the "purpose" in a way that promotes the creativity not only of the first-comer, but also of subsequent authors in the same field.
that developments in the law of federal preemption limit its potential application. Accordingly, we conclude that the decision should not be restated as a rule of general applicability. Id. § 38 Reporters' Memorandum (citation omitted).
35. All these works set forth ways of achieving "a certain result." 45 Moreover, these works share the duality of "text" and "behavior" described by the Manifesto. 46 For example, the "text" of a musical score or of a choreographic work exists to be executed; the notations have value primarily as instructions to the performance of the musical or choreographic task. As with computer programs, the particular form of the "instructions" does not define the work: if a choreographic work is initially expressed in Laban notation, it is no excuse to an infringement charge that defendant's copy was rendered in Benesh notation. The "work" is the collection of dance movements, not the particular language in which the movement is expressed. By the same token, the code in which a computer program is written sets forth, but does not necessarily constitute, the copyrighted work.
One might object that this discussion has so far concerned aesthetic works, while computer programs are "functional." But copyright also protects architectural plans, even though these set forth instructions to construct a "functional" object, a building. Moreover, since the 1990 Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, 4 7 it is clear that architectural plans are infringed not only by copying in the initial format, but also by following the plans to execute the building, 48 so long as the building's function does not compel its form. 49 In general, apart from the specific category of "pictorial, graphic and sculptural works," U.S. copyright law does not distinguish between "aesthetic" and "functional" works. Congress has attempted to divide the useful from the beautiful with respect to artworks by requiring that artistic elements of "useful articles" be separable from the article's utilitarian aspects.
5 0 However, the artworks regime is both anomalous and largely un- Instead, copyright law in general addresses the kind of concerns that underlie the applied art limitation-fear of monopolization of inappropriate subject matter-through the long-established idea-expression dichotomy and idea-expression merger doctrines. The copyright statute, adopting a long case-law tradition, 55 codifies the idea-expression dichotomy as follows: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation... regardless of the form in which it is... embodied in such work." 5 6 In other words, while the overall presentation of a work exposing ideas or describing a process is protected, the ideas disclosed or processes revealed are not. The merger doctrine, as applied in myriad judicial decisions, denies copyright protection to those expressions of ideas that permit too few variations, lest by protecting the expression copyright also privatize the idea. 5 7 Hence, it is not surprising that in many of the computer software litigations, courts have rejected merger 51. See, e.g., Shim Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Designs of Useful Articles, 37J. Copyright Soc'y 339 (1990) (detailed discussion of the case law).
52. See Manifesto, supra note 1, at 2352, in which the authors evoke the pictorialgraphic-sculptural work "useful article" doctrine, and recommend its extension to distinguishing functional from expressive behaviors.
However, the extension is imperfect, since the statute excludes from the realm of "useful articles" works "having an intrinsic utilitarian function ... merely to... 54. See also Dam, supra note 17, at 3-7 (rejecting functionality objection to copyright protection for software, and concluding that "the usefulness of software is an argument for, rather than against, copyright protection for software.").
55. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (rejecting attempt to invoke copyright protection of accounting forms in order to prevent unauthorized use of the bookkeeping system).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988 defenses when a plaintiff shows that unrelated competitors are exploiting functionally similar programs that were not copied from the plaintiff's. 58 However, evocation of the idea-expression dichotomy and merger doctrines does not resolve the problem, without also elucidating what constitutes an unprotectable idea, and what comprises protectable expression. This is one of the hardest tasks in traditional copyright analysis. 5 9 It remains difficult, but not necessarily more so, when computer programs are at issue.
Congress has supplied two arguably inconsistent directives pertinent to computer programs. First, for all works of authorship, Congress in the 1976 Copyright Act declared that protection does not "extend to... process [es] ." 60 Second, in 1980, Congress enacted amendments to the 1976 Act, to make clear that computer programs are protected by copyright law. Congress then defined a "computer program" as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 6 1 There may be some tension between In enacting thd 1980 amendments, Congress adopted, virtually verbatim, the recommendations of the Commission on New these two texts: a "set of instructions used in order to bring about a certain result" would appear, at least in lay terms, to constitute a "process," "system," or "method of operation." Since one should endeavor to construe statutes in a way that does not render them futile, 62 and since we know that Congress did determine in 1980 to protect computer programs, 63 the terms "process," "system," or "method of operation" must not be understood literally. As a result, some ways of achieving "a certain result" (i.e., some "behaviors") will be protected by copyright. 64 What ways, and what results?
The tried-and-true (but nonetheless maddeningly elusive) "abstractions test" determines the "result" whose achievement may be protected, so long as there are a sufficient variety of alternative ways to that end. The debate, which cuts across classes of copyrighted works, focuses on the level of specificity or generality at which the "result" (or idea) is defined. 65 The more specific the idea, the more likely the merger doctrine is to disqualify plaintiff's work; the more broadly defined the idea, the more likely plaintiff's rendition will survive scrutiny, and the broader the scope of plaintiff's potential protection as well. 66 In effect, the merger
